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The study determine the effect of CEO duality on the effective tax rate of 
quoted foods and Beverage companies. Ex-post facto research design was 
adopted. A purposive sampling technique was applied in selecting nine (9) 
companies during the data collection process. Data were collected from 
annual reports and accounts of the sampled companies from 2013-2019. 
Data for the study analyzed using descriptive statistics and regression 
was used with aid of the e-view was at 95% confidence at five degrees of 
freedom (df). The result shows that CEO duality was significant and had 
a positive coefficient on tax planning of food and beverage companies in 
Nigeria. The study, therefore recommended that non-separation of CEO 
from Chairman of the Board may lead to higher levels of tax planning; and 
an opportunity for manager’s rent extraction, because of their dominating 
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance refers to policies and procedures 
adopted by firms to achieve certain sets of objectives, cor-
porate missions, and visions concerning different stake-
holders [1]. Corporate governance enhances the means 
through which the objectives are set, and the means of 
executing those objectives and monitoring performance 
are ascertained [2]. It is directed at improving corporate 
behaviour and the reliability of accounting information 
provided to the stakeholders [3]. Corporate governance is 
a combination of company’s management, board, share-
holders, and other stakeholders [2] According to [4], corpo-
rate governance ascertain if the finance providers earn a 
return on their investments.
Tax is a levy imposed on individual or legal entity by 
the Government or agent [5]. The government uses the pro-
ceeds from the tax to provide its legal functions, which 
include the provision of amenities and infrastructure, 
defense against external aggression, maintenance of law 
and order, regulate economy [5-6]. Corporate tax avoidance 
refers to the deliberate attempt to reduce the amount of 
taxes paid. Tax avoidance can be divided into acceptable 
(legal) tax avoidance and unacceptable (illegal) tax avoid-
ance [7]. 
Previously, manufacturing companies in Nigeria were 
required to prepare accounts using the Statement of 
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Accounting Standards. However, following the recom-
mendation of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria 
(FRCN), henceforth from 2012 all manufacturing com-
panies complied with the provisions of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards in the preparation of finan-
cial statements. On January 15, 2019, the FRCN released 
the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (‘the Code’), 
according to Sections 11(c) and 41(c) of the Financial Re-
porting Council of Nigeria Act, 2011. This formed part of 
the move to strengthen and institutionalize corporate gov-
ernance best practices in Nigerian companies. The Code 
adopts an approach in designing the minimum standards 
of practice that all the firms should adhere to [8]. 
Different stakeholders perceive such tax avoidance acts 
differently from its consequent implication. For instance, 
shareholders may prefer tax avoidance because it increas-
es residual income and lowers the cost of debt [9]; whereas, 
the Government kick against tax avoidance because it 
lowers the amount of revenue available for developmental 
activities [10]. Negative consequences of tax avoidance in-
clude reputational damage and a decline in firm value [11]; 
which resulted to a lower in the return on investments of 
the shareholders [12]. Another issue is the question of if the 
firm enhances the economic well-being of the society [13]. 
Other consequences that may arise are related to political 
costs and marginal costs. High corporate tax avoidance 
leads to higher political costs [14]. Marginal costs are po-
tential costs, such as penalties and fines imposed by the 
tax authorities [15]. Corporate tax avoidance is an outcome 
of policies/decisions taken by the leaders of a company [16]. 
Within the Nigerian context, few studies are yet to 
address the efficiency with which the board and other 
sub-committees discharge their responsibilities. According 
to [17] board and committee activity may be measured by 
the frequency of meetings. 
Prior studies have conducted research on this nature 
in several countries.  The studies provide counterintui-
tive predictions on the link between governance and tax 
avoidance. While some reported a positive effect, others 
report a negative association.  Such studies have mainly 
used proxies such as meeting frequency, board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, among others as proxies for 
good corporate governance. The study therefore, sought to 
analyze the effect of corporate governance on tax avoid-
ance from a developing country perspective. 
2. Review of Related Literature
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Several authors have defined corporate governance 
from diverse perspectives; According to [18], This ex-
propriation acts include among others the diversion of 
profits/output; sale of assets or securities to other firms 
at below-market (fair) prices; employ unqualified family 
members in managerial positions; and/or over compensa-
tion packages. Corporate governance is concerned with 
enhancing corporate fairness, transparency, and account-
ability [19]. 
Corporate governance is the mechanisms aim at ensur-
ing the fulfillment of corporate objectives [20,21] stated that 
corporate governance is the process that allows directors 
and auditors to assume their obligations towards share-
holders and company stakeholders”. [22] corporate gov-
ernance as the systems that checkmate both internal and 
external to activities of companies to ensure that compa-
nies discharge their accountability to their stakeholders”. 
[23]documented that “corporate governance is a procedure, 
by which corporate resources allocated in a way to attract 
stakeholders wealth. According to [24], it involves firm;s 
management, shareholders and stakeholders”. Corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled [25]. The Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development [26] outlined five principles of 
corporate governance to include: 
The rights of shareholders 
Equitable treatment of shareholders 
The role of stakeholders 
Disclosure and transparency 
The responsibility of the board. 
Broadly, corporate governance mechanisms are sub-
divided into two: internal and external corporate govern-
ance mechanisms. The external governance mechanisms 
include such as the market for corporate control, the legal 
system, stock market, among others [27-28]. Internal govern-
ance mechanisms include such as the board of directors, 
manager’s compensation, audit committee, remuneration 
committee, and ownership structure, among others [29-31]. 
The internal governance mechanisms are mainly associ-
ated with the structure, composition and, characteristics 
of the board of directors [32]. The study by [33] found a rela-
tionship between improved corporate governance and firm 
performance.
2.2 Corporate Tax Avoidance (CTA)
Corporate tax avoidance (CTA) has no specific accept-
ed definition o in the literature [12]. This lack of universal 
definition follows the consequential tax effect of every 
business transaction aimed at increasing profit [13]. Accord-
ing to [34] CTA involves “taking advantage of legitimate 
concessions and exemptions foreseen in the tax law; and, 
involves the process of organizing business operations 
so that tax obligations are optimized at their minimum 
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amount”. [35], reported that tax aggressiveness is the differ-
ent legal or illegal activities management engaged to re-
duce taxable income. Tax planning forms part of strategic 
decisions by the managers aimed at reducing explicit and 
implicit taxes [36]. [13] defined CTA as a strategy in reducing 
corporate tax liabilities.
[37] opine that CTA refers to as a means of minimizing 
the company’s tax accounting income”. [12] sees tax avoid-
ance as a strategy to reduce taxable income (e.g., tax shel-
ters) at the other end.  
[34] observed that generally, tax planning activities lead 
to a reduction in tax obligations. This however depends 
on the intensity and legality with which these practices 
are adopted. [38], stated that tax avoidance is the legal ap-
plication of tax laws to one’s selfish interest in order to 
minimize the taxable income within the law.” [39], sees tax 
aggressiveness as an arrangement with the aim of avoid-
ing tax. 
Tax planning, avoidance or, aggressiveness has signif-
icant costs and benefits to a firm and its shareholders [40]. 
The benefits to the firm include such as higher cash flows 
and net income; while, to the shareholders, it implies 
higher residual income [41]. The costs include negative 
consequences such as large penalties, negative publicity [42], 
political costs [14], or the firm labelled as a “poor corporate 
citizen” [11]. Three conditions must exist for an individual 
or firm to engage in tax avoidance; incentive, access, and 
awareness [43]. Incentive implies that the perceived benefit 
must outweigh its costs. Access presupposes that the in-
dividual or firm has access to tax-minimizing strategies. 
Finally, the individual or firm is aware of the applicable 
tax laws that allow such opportunities available to avoid 
taxes.
[13] identified three classes of groups used in prior liter-
ature to measure tax avoidance. Which comprise of total 
book-tax gap; measures the proportional amount of taxes 
to business income and measures such discretionary.
There are several methods and/or schemes by which 
corporations engage in tax avoidance. [44], identified the 
use of transfer pricing, royalty programs, off shore tax 
havens and structured transactions. [45] identified other 
methods such as debt allocation as well as sourcing rules 
for foreign tax credits.
2.3 CEO Duality 
[46] stated that a measure of board independence is 
whether the CEO also serves as the board chairman. The 
separation of CEO from Board chairman ensures adequate 
monitoring and checkmating the activities of manage-
ment [24]. The non-separation of the two functions presents 
an obstacle and leads to managerial entrenchment [47]. 
Non-separation of the two roles decreases the effective-
ness of the board in monitoring management [48]; and, its 
ability to control managers effectively [49].  The empirical 
literature documents mixed findings on the association be-
tween CEO duality and firm performance. 
[50] found a significant negative association between 
duality and disclosure. On the contrary, [51] found an insig-
nificant relationship between duality and disclosure. [52] re-
ported a positive association between board independence 
and audit fees. However, the positive association was only 
present in firms without CEO duality; suggestive of the 
fact that CEO duality constraints board independence.
2.4 Empirical Studies
Quite a number of researchers have conducted a study 
on corporate governance and tax avoidance; the study of 
[53] ascertained the effect of corporate board characteristics 
and tax aggressiveness of Nigerian manufacturing firms. 
Sample of forty-nine (49) manufacturing firms was used. 
Data were obtained from annual financial statements for 
the years 2011 to 2016. The data were analyzed using the 
fixed effect panel regression model. The results showed 
that board size and board independence exert a significant 
negative effect on tax aggressiveness; while, board gender 
had an insignificant negative effect. [54], examined the ef-
fect of corporate governance, tax avoidance, and financial 
constraints’. The sample comprised of over thirty-five 
thousand (35,000) firm-year observations from 1990 to 
2015. They employed two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
analysis to validate the hypothesis. The results showed 
that for firms with strong governance, tax avoidance had 
a negative impact on financial constraints. However, in 
weak governance, tax avoidance is associated with greater 
financial constraints and a greater likelihood of financial 
distress. [55], ascertained the Demographic characteristics 
of the board of directors’ structure and tax avoidance from 
Tehran Stock Exchange.  The study relied on secondary 
data; between the periods 2012 to 2016. The hypothesis 
was tested using panel regression models. The results 
showed that the presence of women on corporate boards 
reduces corporate tax avoidance; also, firms with larger 
board sizes were associated with more tax avoidance. [56],
conducted a study titled ‘Corporate tax and financial per-
formance of listed Nigerian consumer goods’. The sample 
comprised of sixteen consumer goods firms quoted on the 
NSE. The data were analyzed using multiple regression 
analysis. The results showed an insignificant negative 
relationship between corporate tax and ROA. However, 
age and risk had a positive non-significant relationship 
with ROA; while, size showed a positive significant rela-
tionship with ROA. [57], investigated corporate tax avoid-
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ance of listed firms in Nigeria’. The sample comprised 
of nineteen (19) listed firms drawn from the list of NSE 
30 firms on the Nigeria Stock Exchange. The data were 
obtained from annual accounts and were analyzed using 
descriptive statistics. The results showed that there exists 
variation across firms in the average long-run cash ETR. [4],
undertook a study titled ‘Tax Avoidance and Corporate 
Governance. The sample comprised four hundred and 
ninety five (495) firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 
firms. The study covered the period from 2007 to 2015. 
The study relied on secondary data from Compustat and 
Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS). The hypothesis 
was validated using the fixed effects model. The results 
showed that board independence had a significant negative 
effect on tax avoidance; while, CEO duality had a nega-
tive insignificant effect on tax avoidance. [58], conducted 
a study whether corporate governance affect earnings 
management on tax aggressiveness?’ The study employed 
secondary data from annual report and accounts from the 
official website of the companies and the IDX website. 
The results showed that good corporate governance mod-
erates the influence of earnings management toward the 
tax aggressiveness.[59], studied the impact of governance 
mechanisms on tax aggressiveness: Empirical evidence 
from Tunisian context’. The sample comprised thirty-nine 
(39) firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. The 
data were analyzed using multiple regression techniques. 
The results showed that board size had negative non-sig-
nificant effect on tax aggressiveness. Diversity, manageri-
al ownership, firm size, and debt had a positive significant 
effect. The variable of audit quality had a positive non-sig-
nificant effect; while, ownership concentration had a neg-
ative significant effect. [60] conducted a study titled ‘The 
quality of reported earnings and the monitoring role of the 
board: Evidence from small and medium companies’. The 
study employed secondary data from the Johanessburg 
Stock Exchange and data from McGregor BFA. They used 
regression to examine the relationship. The study finds no 
evidence that boards and non-executive directors of SMEs 
adopt conservative accounting practices that will result in 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  [61], evaluated the 
impact of the board of directors’ structure on tax avoid-
ance in the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
They employed a binary logistic regression. Results 
showed that board non-executive members and board 
change ratio had a non-significant effect on tax aggressive 
policy. However, CEO duality had a significant effect on 
tax aggressive policy. [62], studied the effects of the board 
of directors’ characteristics on tax aggressiveness’. The 
sample comprised seventy three (73) companies listed on 
the SBF 120 index, France. The study employed multi-
ple regressions to analyze the data. The results showed 
that board size negatively affects effective tax rate; board 
independence has a negative non-significant; board diver-
sity has a positive significant effect on effective tax rate; 
and, CEO duality has a negative non-significant effect on 
effective tax rate.[53], ascertained the effect of the board 
of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness’. 
They employed logit regression to validate the hypothesis. 
The results proved that higher rate of external members 
on the board of directors lower the likelihood of tax ag-
gressiveness. 
3. Methodology
An ex post facto research design was employed. This 
type of design is a systematic empirical inquiry, in which 
the researcher has no direct control of the variables in case 
of manipulation.  
The population of this study covered twelve (12) Foods 
and Beverages in Nigeria. A purposive sampling technique 
was used. A total of three (3) out of the twelve (12) com-
panies were inevitably excluded during the data collection 
process due to unavailability of data. 
3.1 Methods of Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics and regression analysis were used 
to test the relationship between the independent variable 
(CEO Duality) and the dependent variable (corporate tax 
avoidance). This was done with aids of the e-view version 
Table 1. Description of variables
Dependent Variable
CTA it = Proxied as the Effective Tax Rate. This is the proportion of the profit before tax is paid as tax. It is computed as tax paid divided by profit 
before tax. The Statutory Tax Rate is the official corporate tax rate; which presently in Nigeria is 30% of the assessable profit. 
Independent Variable
CEODU it  = Takes the value of 1 if CEO and the chairperson positions are held by the same individual, 0 otherwise in the period (t) 
Control Variables 
Size it = Measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in the period (t)
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9 was at 95% confidence at five degree of freedom (df).
Decision Rule
The alternative hypotheses is to be accepted if the 
p-value is less or equal than the alpha and to be rejected 
the if the p-value is greater than alpha at 5% significance 
level.
Model Specification
ETR (i, t) = α  + CEODU (i, t) + Size (i, t) + µ
Where:
ETR (i, t) = Effective tax rate of firm i at time t
CEODU (i, t) = CEO Duality of firm i at time t
SIZE (i, t) = Firm size of firm i at time t
µ = Error term (stochastic term)
Description of variables 
The table below presents the description of the varia-
bles included in the model
4. Data Analysis and Result
The panel data obtained from the annual reports and 
accounts of the sampled firms from 2013 to 2019.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent (corporate 
governance) variables
ETR CEODUALITY AVERAGE_ASSET
Mean 9.401361 0.761905 1.38E+11
Median 9.000000 1.000000 8.05E+10
Maximum 17.00000 1.000000 7.45E+11
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Std. Dev. 3.259674 0.427374 1.68E+11
Skewness 0.218983 1.229837 1.627434
Kurtosis 2.988632 2.512500 4.808414
Jarque-Bera 1.175654 38.51189 84.92026
Probability 0.555533 0.000000 0.000000
Observations 9 9 9
Source: E-Views 9.
The Table 2 (shown above), presents the mean (average) 
for each of the independent variables, median, their mini-
mum, maximum, standard deviation, Kurtosis, Skewness, 
and the Jarque-Bera statistic (and associated p-value). 
The variable CEO Duality had an average value of 0.761 
(76.2% of the entire observations recorded a value of 
one, i.e., CEO and Chairman of the Board are the same 
person; while 23.8% of the entire observation recorded 
a value of zero). CEO duality is positively skewed. The 
kurtosis values for CEO duality had values less than 3; 
they can be considered platykurtic relative to the normal. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic showed that CEO duality had p 
values>.05. The control variable firm size showed p val-
ues of the Jarque Bera statistic all less than .05; this is an 
indication of non-normality of the variable.
4.2 Test of Hypothesis 
H1:There is a significant effect of CEO duality on ef-
fective tax rate of quoted food and beverage companies in 
Nigeria.
Table 3. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis between 
ETR and CEODU
Dependent Variable: ETR
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 10/02/20   Time: 09:04
Sample: 2013 2019
Included: observations: 7
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.84E-17 3.96E-17 -1.223676 0.2882
CEOUD 1.000000 2.88E-16 3.47E+15 0.0000
SIZE 0.000000 4.49E-22 0.000000 1.0000
R-squared 0.438092 Mean dependent var 1.000000
Adjusted R-squared 0.418327 S.D. dependent var 0.000000
S.E. of regression 2.72E-16 Akaike info criterion 11.70756
Sum squared resid 2.96E-31. Schwarz criterion 1.000000
Log likelihood -874.0671 Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.74018
F-statistic 7.548921 Durbin-Watson stat 0.411106
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000037
Source: E-Views 9.0 Panel Regression Output, 2020.
Table 3 shoes an adjusted R2 value of 0.42. The ad-
justed R2, which represents the coefficient of multiple 
determinations imply that 42% of the total variation in 
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the dependent variable (ETR) of the sampled companies 
in Nigeria is jointly explained by the explanatory vari-
ables (CEODU and SIZE. The adjusted R2 of 42% did not 
constitute a problem to the study because the F- statistics 
value of 7.548921 with an associated Prob.>F = 0.0000 
indicates that the model is fit to explain the relationship 
expressed in the study model. The value of adjusted R2 of 
42% also shows that 58 % of the variation in the depen-
dent variable is explained by other factors not captured 
in the study model. This suggests that apart from CEO-
DU and SIZE there are other factors that mitigate ETR 
of quoted companies in Nigeria. The results shows that 
CEODU has a positive and significant relationship with 
ETR measured with a beta coefficient (β1) and t- value 
of 1.000000 and 3.47 respectively and p- value of 0.000 
which is statistically significant at 5% level.
4.3 Decision 
Based on the empirical evidence that suggests that 
there is a significant effect of CEO duality on effective tax 
rate of quoted food and beverage companies in Nigeria.at 
5% level of significance, thus, the alternative hypothesis 
of the study is accepted.
4.4 Discussion of Findings
All the corporate governance variables were insignif-
icant. Studies have shown that low ETR rates imply that 
a firm engages in tax planning more aggressively; while, 
higher ETR rates may imply a more conservative ap-
proach to tax planning. 
The corporate governance variable of CEO duality was 
significant; CEO duality had a negative coefficient. The 
sign of the coefficient of CEO duality is consistent with 
the study by [61] in Iran using binary logistic regression 
showed that CEO duality had a significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness.
However, the study by [4] on firms drawn from S & P 
500 which documented a negative insignificant effect of 
CEO duality on tax avoidance. [32] showed that tax evasion 
were significantly lower in firms where board chairman is 
also the CEO. Also, [62] reported a negative non-significant 
effect of CEO duality on effective tax rate. 
The control variables firm size is not significant. How-
ever, [16] in Indonesia reported a insignificant positive ef-
fect of firm size and audit quality on tax avoidance. [59] in 
Tunisia, reported a significant positive effect of firm size. 
5. Conclusion 
This study assesses the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate tax avoidance. The study there-
fore, expands the scope of prior research by estimating 
the relationship. This study found that CEO duality im-
pact positively on effective tax rate (ETR), and this was 
statistically significant. The control variable, firm size 
showed statistical insignificance at 5% level. It imply that 
to improve the value of the firm, the owners of the firm 
would prefer to reduce their taxable income. Besides, 
they desired to plan diligently for the company. The study 
therefore, recommended that non-separation of CEO from 
Chairman of the Board may lead to higher levels of tax 
planning; and an opportunity for manager’s rent extrac-
tion, because of their dominating role in order to ensure 
that adequate oversight roles are separated.
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